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THE COURT UPHOLDS A STATE LAW
PROHIBITING PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED
SUICIDE
Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Vacco v. Quill,' the United States Supreme Court ad-
dressed whether a terminally ill person has a constitutionally
protected right to commit suicide with the assistance of a physi-
cian.2  The Court held that state laws prohibiting physician-
assisted suicide are constitutionally permissible since they do
not violate the Equal Protection Clause.3 In making its decision,
the Court determined that the right to die with assistance is not
a fundamental right.4 The Court also concluded that the with-
drawal of lifesaving medical treatment is distinguishable from
physician-assisted suicide 5
This Note argues that the Supreme Court incorrectly con-
cluded that the right to die with assistance is not a fundamental
right.6 In addition, this Note contends that the Court improp-
erly distinguished withdrawal of lifesaving equipment from phy-
sician-assisted suicide.7 This Note further argues that the state
has no legitimate interest in preventing terminally ill patients
from seeking assistance from a physician to hasten their death.8
Finally, this Note addresses the ramifications of the Court's de-
cision.9
1 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997).
2Id.
Id. at 2302.
4 Id. at 2297.
Id. at 2297-98.
6 See infra notes 182-213 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 214-25 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 226-41 and accompanying text.
' See infra notes 242-48 and accompanying text.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. THE "RIGHT TO DIE"
Physician-assisted suicide involves a doctor's performance of
an act that results in the patient's death.10 The debate over phy-
sician-assisted suicide begins with the judicially recognized
"right to die."'" The term "right to die" refers to an individual's
right to discontinue lifesaving medical treatment, even though
the patient will die if treatment is ended.
2
The "right to die" developed as a judicial response to pa-
tients' desires to make critical decisions regarding their own
treatment, decisions traditionally left to the discretion of the
doctor. 3 Beginning with the 1976 case In re Quinlan,'4 courts,
physicians, and the public grew to accept the idea that patient
autonomy, in certain circumstances, extends to life-or-death
treatment decisions. The New Jersey Supreme Court was the
first court to issue a written decision recognizing the right to re-
fuse life-sustaining treatment in Quinlan.5 The case involved
Karen Ann Quinlan, a twenty-two-year-old female who was in a
persistent vegetative state.16 The condition resulted from two fif-
teen-minute periods in which she had stopped breathing.
7
Karen's parents wanted to disconnect their daughter's respira-
tor and other devices which were keeping her alive.'8
The New Jersey Supreme Court held that Karen had a con-
stitutional right to be removed from the lifesaving treatment
and that her guardian father could exercise that right on her
behalf." The court explained that this right to die emanated
from the constitutional right of privacy.2 Although the court
10 Note, Physician-Assisted Suicide and the Right to Die With Assistance, 105 HARV. L.
REV. 2021, 2023 (1992) [hereinafter Physician-Assisted Suicide].
" Id. Both advocates and opponents of physician-assisted suicide often refer to the
"right to die" in espousing their views.
12 Id. at 2021-22.
"Id. at 2022.
355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
Id. at 671.
16 Id. at 654.
17 id.
Id. at 656.
'9 Id. at 671.
2Id. at 663. The court indicated that the right to die implicated concepts of the-
ology, medicine, and the law. Id. The court argued that if the right of privacy is
broad enough to include a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy under cer-
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acknowledged that the state had a strong interest in preserving
life, it reasoned that the state's interest is attenuated when there
is no chance of the patient regaining cognitive life and is out-
weighed by the attendant bodily invasion necessitated by medi-
21cal care.
Thus, Quinlan established precedent permitting terminally
ill patients to withdraw from lifesaving treatment. More impor-
tantly, Quinlan lay the foundation for the principle later es-
poused by the Supreme Court: A patient has the right to end
life-sustaining treatment so long as there is clear and convincing
evidence of the individual's wish for withdrawal of treatment.22
The Supreme Court addressed the "right to die" in Cruzan
v. Director, Missouri Department of Health.5 Cruzan presented the
issue of whether a state may prohibit the withdrawal of life-
sustaining treatment. In Cruzan, the plaintiffs' daughter, Nancy
Beth Cruzan, was severely injured in a car accident.24 After re-
maining in a coma for three weeks, she slipped into a persistent
vegetative state, "a condition in which a person exhibits motor
reflexes but evinces no indications of significant cognitive func-
tion."2 In order to keep her alive, feeding and hydration tubes
were implanted in her stomach.26
With no hope that Nancy's condition would improve, her
parents requested that the hospital end the lifesaving treat-
ment.27 The hospital, however, refused to do so without a court
order.2' Accordingly, Nancy's parents filed a declaratory judg-
ment action to terminate the artificial hydration and nutrition
being supplied to their daughter.2 They argued that Nancy had
tain circumstances, it is also broad enough to include a patient's decision to end life-
saving medical treatment in certain instances. Id. (comparing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973)). The court also explained that the basis for the constitutional right to
privacy "exists in the penumbras of specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights formed by
emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance." Id. (quot-
ing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965)).
" Id. at 664.
See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,286-87 (1990).
"Id. at 261.
Id. at 266.
Benjamin C. Zipursky, Note, The Pedigrees of Rights and Powers in Scalia's Cruzan
Concurrence, 56 U. Pr=r. L. REv. 283, 289 (1994).






a Fourteenth Amendment0 right not to be kept alive by un-
wanted medical procedures.3 '
The state probate court held that Nancy had a state and a
federal constitutional right to refuse treatment.3 2 However, the
Missouri Supreme Court reversed the probate court and held
that since Nancy was unable to make any judgments, she did not
have a right to refuse life-sustaining treatment. 3 The court ar-
gued that the state interest in preserving life "outweighs any
rights invoked on Nancy's behalf to terminate treatment in the
face of the uncertainty of Nancy's wishes and her own right to
life. ,3 4  The Cruzans appealed and the U.S. Supreme Court
granted certioraris 5
The Supreme Court upheld the Missouri Supreme Court's
decision, ruling that Missouri's continuation of lifesaving treat-
ment did not violate Nancy's Fourteenth Amendment rights.
The Court determined that a competent adult has a right to re-
fuse lifesaving treatment based on the common law right to in-
formed consent to treatment and on privacy or liberty interests
found in the Constitution. The Court explained that, al-
though an individual has a liberty interest under the Due Proc-
ess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,s the inquiry does not
end there.39 Rather, to ascertain whether an individual's rights
" The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any per-
son of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any per-
son within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
3' Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 268.
32 Id.
" Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 760 S.W.2d 408, 426 (Mo. 1988) (en
banc).
34 id.
Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 492 U.S. 917 (1989).
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 287.
"Id. The Cruzan Court cited previous cases which discussed both the common law
right to informed consent to treatment and the constitutional privacy/liberty inter-
ests. See In re Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d
1209 (N.J. 1985) (holding that the right to self-determination ordinarily outweighs
any countervailing state interests, and that competent persons are permitted to refuse
lifesaving medical treatment).
See supra note 30.
"Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279.
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have been violated, a court must "balance his liberty interests
against the relevant state interests."40
Second, the Court stated that when a patient is incompe-
tent, lifesaving treatment will not be discontinued unless there
is clear and convincing evidence that the incompetent individ-
ual would want to withdraw treatment.41 The Court determined
that there was not clear and convincing evidence that Nancy
would have wanted the lifesaving procedures terminated; ac-
cordingly, the Court upheld the Missouri Supreme Court's rul-
ing.4' However, although the Court did not permit Nancy's
parents to end their daughter's lifesaving treatment, it did rec-
ognize for the first time that the "right to die" can exist in other
factual contexts.43
B. THE RIGHT TO PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE
Historically, most societies have discouraged acts of physi-
cian-assisted suicide.44 This view is demonstrated in the Hippo-
cratic Oath45 which states, "I will give no deadly medicine to
anyone if asked, nor suggest such counsel ... ,4 In ancient
times, suicide was a criminal offense, punishable by forfeiture of
property to the king and a dishonorable burial.47 An individual
who assisted in a suicide was guilty of murder since he was a
"second-degree principal to the death."' Today, no state treats
40 Id. Missouri claimed that its interest in the protection and preservation of hu-
man life outweighed the interests of Nancy's parents in ending her lifesaving treat-
ment. Id. at 280-81.
", Id. at 282. The requisite evidence consists of "proof sufficient to persuade the
trier of fact that the patient held a firm and settled commitment to the termination of
life supports under the circumstances like those presented." Id. at 285 (quoting In re
Westchester County Med. Ctr., 531 N.E.2d 607, 613 (N.Y. 1988)).
412 Id. at 286-87.
43Id.
" Willard C. Shih, Note, Assisted Suicide, the Due Process Clause and "Fidelity in Trans-
lation, "63 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1245, 1273 (1995).
See A. CASrIGuONI, HiSTORY OF MEDIcINE 148 (E. Krumbhaar trans., Knopf Publ.
2d ed. 1947) (1941).
46 Id at 154.
'7 Note, The Punishment of Suicide-A Need for Change, 14 VIL. L. REV. 463, 465
(1969).
"' Sue Woolf Brenner, Note, Undue Influence in the Criminal Law: A Proposed Analysis
of the Criminal Offense of "Causing Suicide, "47 ALB. L. REV. 62, 64 (1982).
1998]
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suicide itself as a felony, although most states have retained laws
criminalizing assisted suicide. 9
In 1995, the issue of assisted suicide came to the forefront
of legal debate when an Oregon district courte0 held that a law
authorizing physician-assisted suicide violates the Equal Protec-
don Clause. 1 In Lee v. Oregon, a court for the first time analyzed
whether physician-assisted suicide violated the Equal Protection
Clause.52  The plaintiffs5 3 claimed that Oregon's "Death With
Dignity Act '54 violates the Equal Protection Clause, arguing that
its classification of terminally ill patients is not rationally related
to a legitimate state interest.55 The court agreed with the plain-
tiffs and held the act unconstitutional.6
In finding the law unconstitutional, the court described sev-
eral inadequacies of the Act's protections for the terminally ill.
57
In addition, the court found no rational relationship between
the state interests and the terminally ill/non-terminally ill dis-
tinction. 8 Lee v. Oregon was the first time a court found a statute
49 Shih, supra note 44, at 1277-78. For a further discussion of the history of suicide
and assisted suicide, see infra notes 186-98 and accompanying text.
'0 Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429 (D. Or. 1995).
5 See supra note 30. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
guarantees that similarly situated persons will be treated alike under the law. See id.
Legislation is presumed valid under the clause if "a classification drawn by a statute is
rationally related to a legitimate state interest." Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221
(1981).
52 Lee, 891 F. Supp. at 1429.
The plaintiffs consisted of Gary Lee, William Petty, Eric Dutson, Janice Eisner,
Claudine Sottler, Jeffrey M. Weinkauf, Fritz Beck, June Beck, Sister Geraldine Ber-
nards, and Maryville Nursing Home. Id.
" In 1994, Oregon passed the "Oregon Death With Dignity Act" and became the
first state to permit physician-assisted suicide for the terminally ill. Id. at 1437.
55 Id.
56Id.
" See id. at 1434-37. Some of the inadequacies included: that the "procedures de-
signed to differentiate between the competent and incompetent are not sufficient;"
that there is "inadequate mental evaluation," thereby failing to detect depression; and
that the "act does not provide for an independently chosen consulting physician to
confirm that a person is capable and acting voluntarily." Id.
"Id. The court found three aspects of the Act to be unconstitutional: (1) the pro-
vision of the Act "which establishes procedure for determining whether patient was
competent to opt for assisted suicide by referral through attending physician was not
rationally related to any legitimate state interest for equal protection purposes;" (2)
the provision of the act which establishes a subjective good faith standard of care for
physicians was also not rationally related to any legitimate state interest; and (3) the
Act failed to ensure that the decision to commit suicide was voluntary. Id.
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permitting physician-assisted suicide to be unconstitutional on
equal protection grounds.
Recently, the Supreme Court analyzed whether physician-
assisted suicide violates the Due Process Clause.59 The Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment6 protects individuals
from government interference in fundamental rights and liberty
interests. 6' In Washington v. Glucksberg,2 the Supreme Court held
that the asserted right to physician-assisted suicide is not a fun-
damental liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause.0
In 1994, three terminally ill patients, four physicians, and a
nonprofit organization challenged a Washington statute64 pro-
hibiting assisted suicide, arguing that it violated the Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitution.0 The District
Court for the Western District of Washington found the statute
unconstitutional,6 upon which the State of Washington ap-
pealed.67 The Ninth Circuit, in a 2-1 decision, concluded that
there was no constitutional basis to invalidate the statute and re-
versed the lower court's decision.64 Subsequently, the Ninth
'9 Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
6 See supra note 30.
61 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). In Casey, the Court
determined that states may restrict abortion so long as they do not place an "undue
burden" on the woman's right to choose. Id. Fundamental rights are protected by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A right is fundamental if: (1)
it is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition; or (2) it is implicit in the
concept of "ordered liberty." Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2268.
612 Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2258.
63 Id. at 2275.
WASH. REv. CODE § 9A.36.0601(1) (1994).
Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1456 (W.D. Wash.
1994).
66 Id. at 1467. The district court found the statute unconstitutional for two reasons.
First, the statute violated a constitutionally guaranteed liberty interest. Id. at 1459-62.
Citing Casey, the court explained that the Due Process Clause permits a patient to
make personal decisions regarding his or her own dignity and autonomy. Id. The
court also analyzed Cruzan, which acknowledged an individual's right to refuse lifesav-
ing medical treatment. Id. at 1461-62. On the basis of these two cases, the court con-
cluded that there is no constitutional distinction between withdrawing lifesaving
treatment and physician-assisted suicide. Id. at 1462. Second, the court held that the
statute violated the Equal Protection Clause since competent, terminally ill people on
life support may quicken their deaths by refusing life-sustaining treatment while those
not on life support may not receive assistance in hastening their deaths. See id. at
1466-67.67 Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 594.
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Circuit en banc determined that the statute violated the Due
Process Clause and affirmed the district court's decision.69
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Ninth Cir-
cuit, holding that statutes prohibiting physician-assisted suicide
do not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 70 Writing for the majority, Chief'Justice Rehnquist
began with an historical analysis of assisted suicide from which
he concluded that society has made it a crime to assist in a sui-
cide.7' The Chief Justice then addressed the due process issue,
explaining that the Due Process Clause is to be applied only in
narrow circumstances.72 The Court determined that the Wash-
ington statute does not present one of these circumstances; it
does not involve a liberty specially protected by the clause.73
First, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that "legal doctrine" and
"state policy" indicate that there is no right to assisted suicide.74
He cited both Cruzan and Casey in support of his conclusion that
the law historically has prohibited assisted suicide.75 Both cases,
according to Chief Justice Rehnquist, stand for the proposition
that "the asserted right to assistance in committing suicide is not
'9 Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc), rev'd
sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997). First, the Ninth Circuit
determined that "choosing the time and manner of one's death constitutes a liberty
interest," id. at 798, a finding based on case law regarding personal decisions about
marriage, procreation, and family life. See id. at 800-02, 812-16. Although the court
concluded that the "right to die" is not a fundamental right, it characterized it as a
strong interest. Id. at 802-05. Second, the en banc court discussed six interests: "(1)
preserving life; (2) preventing suicide; (3) avoiding the involvement of third parties
and use of arbitrary, unfair, or undue influence; (4) protecting family members and
loved ones; (5) protecting the integrity of the medical profession; (6) avoiding the
future movement toward euthanasia and other abuses." Id. at 816. The court then
held that these interests do not outweigh a terminally ill patient's desire to hasten
death. Id. at 836-37. Ultimately, the court concluded that a ban on assisted suicide
violates the Due Process Clause. Id. at 838.
70 Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2262 (1997).
", Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist stated, "In almost every State--indeed, in almost
every western democracy--it is a crime to assist a suicide. The States' assisted-suicide
bans are not innovations. Rather, they are longstanding expressions of the States'
commitment to the protection and preservation of all human life." Id. at 2263.
' Id. at 2267. Rehnquist explained, "We ha[ve] always been reluctant to expand
the concept of substantive due process because guideposts for responsible decision-
making in this unchartered area are scarce and open-ended." Id.
7' Id. at 2269.
74 Id.
7' Id. at 2269-71.
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a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process
Clause."75
Finally, the Court declared that the State of Washington's
ban on assisted suicide is rationally related to legitimate gov-
ernment interests.7 The Court explained that, since the inter-
ests are "at least reasonably related to their promotion and
protection," it is not necessary to weigh their strengths.78 There-
fore, under Glucksberg, state statutes banning physician-assisted
suicide do not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.7
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In the State of New York, it is a crime to cause or aid an-
other to commit suicide or to attempt suicide. ° On July 20,
1994, three physicians81 and three terminally ill patients
82
brought suit against New York's Attorney General,83 claiming
that New York's law against assisted suicide is unconstitutional.
The plaintiffs alleged that the Fourteenth Amendment guaran-
tees the liberty of mentally competent, terminally ill adults with
no chance of recovery to make decisions about the end of their
lives,ts that the right to assisted suicide is a fundamental right,
and that New York's laws are unconstitutional under the Due
76 Id. at 2271.
' Id. at 2272. For a list of the state interests, see discussion supra note 69.
78 Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2275.
7 Id.
' New York Penal Law § 125.15 provides: "A person is guilty of manslaughter in
the second degree when:... (3) He intentionally ... aids another person to commit
suicide. A violation of this provision is classified as a class C felony." N.Y. PENAL LAw
§ 125.15 (McKinney 1987). New York Penal Law § 120.30 provides: "A person is guilty
of promoting a suicide attempt when he intentionally.., aids another person to at-
tempt suicide. A violation of this provision is classified as a class E felony." Id. §
120.30.
8 The physicians were Dr. Timothy E. Quill, Dr. Samuel G. Klagsbrun, and Dr.
Howard A. Grossman. SeeVacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293, 2296 (1997).
12 The patients were Jane Doe, George Kingsley, and William A. Barth. All have
since died. Id.
8 The New York Attorney General during the district court hearing was Oliver
Koppell. See Quill v. Koppell, 870 F. Supp. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). Koppell was later re-
placed by Dennis Vacco. See Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996).
8' Quill, 870 F. Supp. at 80.
85 Id.
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Process Clause.s They also claimed that the prohibition against
physician-assisted suicide violates the Equal Protection Clause,
alleging that the law treats terminally ill patients differently
from terminally ill patients on life supportta They claimed the
law denies terminally ill patients the freedom to choose to has-
ten death, while terminally ill patients dependant on lifesaving
medical treatment are able to withdraw from the life-sustaining
treatment.89
On September 16, 1994, the plaintiffs moved for a prelimi-
nary injunction in the District Court of the Southern District of
New York to enjoin then-Attorney General Koppell and "all per-
sons acting in concert and participation with him from enforc-
ing New York Penal Law sections 125.15(3) and 120.30 against
physicians who prescribe medications which mentally compe-
tent, terminally ill patients may use to hasten their impending
deaths."90 The plaintiffs also submitted declarations9' describing
the suffering each plaintiff-patient had endured due to his or
her illness.92 In addition, all three plaintiffs requested the provi-
sion of drugs to hasten their deaths.3
6 Brief for Petitioner at 3, Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997) (No. 95-1858).
For the text of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, see supra note
30.
07 See supra note 30.
'a Quill, 80 F.3d at 719.
89 Id.
"oId. at 719-20.
"For a full description of the declarations, see Brief for Respondent at 5, Vacco v.
Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997) (No. 95-1858).
Quill, 80 F.3d at 719. Ms. Doe explained in her declaration that she had a large
cancerous tumor that was wrapped around the right carotid artery in her neck, caus-
ing her esophagus to collapse and making it difficult for her to swallow. Id. at 720. As
a result of her condition, doctors had to insert a feeding tube into her stomach which
also caused serious problems. Id. Mr. Kingsley suffered from AIDS-related cryptospo-
ridiosis, cytomegalovirus retinitis, and toxoplasmosis. Id. Mr. Kingsley's illness re-
quired him to self-administer medication through a Hickman tube connected to an
artery in his chest, a treatment which prevented him from conducting simple routine
functions such as taking a shower. Id. Mr. Barth submitted a declaration describing
how his AIDS-related diseases caused severe diarrhea, fevers, vomiting, and abdomi-
nal pain. Id.
9' Id. at 720. Each of the plaintiffs articulated his or her desire for drugs. Id. For
instance, Ms. Doe stated, "I want to have drugs available for the purpose of hastening
my death in a humane and certain manner." Id. Mr. Kingsley stated, "It is my desire
that my physician prescribe suitable drugs for me to consume for the purpose of has-
tening my death when and if my suffering becomes intolerable." Id. Similarly, Mr.
Barth explained, "I understand that there are no cures.... I can no longer endure
PHYSICTAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE
In the affidavits, the physician-plaintiffs alleged that in their
profession, they encountered "mentally competent, terminally
ill patients who request assistance in the voluntary self-
termination of life."9 4 The doctors explained that these patients
experience severe pain and seek to hasten their own deaths be-
cause of the chronic suffering. 5 However, the physicians stated,
they are prohibited under New York law from exercising their
professional judgment and administering the requested drugs.9
On October 11, 1994, Attorney General Koppell filed a
cross-motion for judgment on the pleadings.97 Thereafter, the
plaintiffs submitted a supplemental declaration from Dr. Quill,
in which he described the actions a doctor takes when a patient
refuses life-sustaining medical treatment.98  Dr. Quill then
pointed out the irony of distinguishing withdrawal of lifesaving
treatment from physician-assisted suicide: "Unfortunately, some
dying patients who are in agony that can no longer be relieved,
yet are not dependent on life-sustaining treatment, have no
such options under current legal restrictions."9'
On December 16, 1994, the district court denied the plain-
tiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction and granted the de-
fendants' cross motion to dismiss the action.1°° First, addressing
the due process issue, the court held that physician-assisted sui-
cide is not a fundamental rightio' protected by the Constitu-
tion.102 The court also held that the criminalization of physician-
the pain and suffering... and I want to have drugs available for the purpose of has-




97 Id. Attorney General Koppell filed this cross-motion so that the court could
make a decision based upon the pleadings filed. Koppell's goal was to end the case at
this point.
'3 Id. at 721.
'9 Id. Dr. Jack Froom also submitted a declaration in which he claimed that physi-
cians are able to ascertain when a patient's request to hasten death is rational. Id.
" Quill v. Koppell, 870 F. Supp. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). ChiefJudge Griesa treated
the cross-motion as one for summary judgment "since the court has considered mat-
ters outside the pleadings-i.e., declarations filed on the motion for preliminary in-
junction." Id. at 79.
"' See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
"2 Quill 870 F. Supp. at 82-84. The Court explained that the plaintiffs made "no
attempt to argue that physician-assisted suicide, even in the case of terminally ill pa-
tients, has any historic recognition as a legal right." Id. at 83.
1998]
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assisted suicide is not a violation of the Equal Protection Clause
of the Constitution. °3
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the portion of the
district court's opinion that found no substantive due process
right to assisted suicide.0 However, the court noted that the
Supreme Court is reluctant to expand fundamental rights that
are not supported by the text of the Constitution.05 In light of
that reluctance, the court determined that the right to die with
assistance is neither rooted in our nation's history nor implicit
in the concept of "ordered liberty."'' 6 As such, the right to as-
sisted suicide is not a fundamental right.
0 7
Having determined that no due process violation was at is-
sue, the Second Circuit addressed whether the ban offends the
Equal Protection Clause.1'0 According to the court, physician-
assisted suicide is no different than the withdrawal of life-
sustaining medical treatment.1°9 However, the court noted that
New York accords different treatment to those who wish to has-
ten death through self-administered drugs than it does to those
who wish to do so by removing life-support systems."0 Further-
more, these distinctions do not justify any purpose in "prolong-
'o' Id. at 85. The court indicated that the state has a valid interest in prohibiting
physician-assisted suicide:
It is hardly unreasonable or irrational for the State to recognize a differ-
ence between allowing nature to take its course, even in the most severe situa-
tions, and intentionally using an artificial death-producing device. The State has
obvious legitimate interests in preserving life, and in protecting vulnerable per-
sons. The State has the further right to determine how these crucial interests are
to be treated when the issue is posed as to whether a physician can assist a patient
in committing suicide.
Id. at 84-85.
04 Quill, 80 F.3d at 723. The court explained that a right is accorded heightened
judicial protection only if it is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" or "deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition." Id.
'05 Id. at 724.
106 id.
'07 Id. at 725.
108 Id.
'09 Id. at 729.
"o Id. The court noted:
It seems clear that New York does not treat similarly circumstanced persons
alike: those in the final stages of terminal illness who are on life-support systems
are allowed to hasten their deaths by directing the removal of such systems; but
those who are similarly situated, except for the previous attachment of life-
sustaining equipment, are not allowed to hasten death by self-administering pre-
scribed drugs.
Id.
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ing a life that is all but ended.""' Accordingly, the court con-
cluded that there is no rational basis for the statute's prohibi-
tion against terminally ill persons obtaining assistance in
hastening their death with self-administered drugs.1
2
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certio-
rari"3 to determine whether New York Penal Law §§ 125.15(3)
and 120.30, prohibiting assisted suicide, violate the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution.
IV. SUMMARY OF THE COURT'S OPINION
A. MAJORITY OPINION
In a unanimous opinion authored by Chief justice
Rehnquist, 4 the Supreme Court reversed- the decision of the
Second Circuit, holding that the New York statutes prohibiting
physician-assisted suicide do not violate the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."5
As a threshold matter, the Court addressed the appropriate
standard of review.11 6 Since New York's statutes outlawing as-
sisted suicide do not involve a fundamental right or target a
suspect class, the laws would be upheld as long as they are ra-
tionally related to some legitimate end."7  Chief Justice
"' Id. The court remarked:
And what business is it of the state to require the continuation of agony
when the result is imminent and inevitable? What concern prompts the state to
interfere with a mentally competent person's "right to define [his] own concept
of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life,"
when the patient seeks to have drugs prescribed to end life during the final
stages of a terminal illness? The greatly reduced interest of the state in preserv-
ing life compels the answer to these questions: None.
Id. at 730.
112Id. at 731. Judge Calabresi wrote a concurring opinion in which he agreed with
the court that the New York statutes are unconstitutional. Id. (Calabresi, J., concur-
ring). However, Calabresi felt that the penal provisions should be sent back to the
New York State Legislature on constitutional remand so that the legislature clearly
could express the interests of the state should the state want to re-enact the statutes.
Id. (Calabresi,J., concurring).
.Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 36 (1996).
,, Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined in Chief Justice
Rehnquist's opinion.
" Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997). See also supra note 30.
116 Quil, 117 S. Ct. at 2297.
'7 Id. (citing Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1627 (1996)).
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Rehnquist further noted that under the rational basis standard,
there is a strong presumption that the laws are valid.""
The Court then addressed whether New York law treats
equally all people who are terminally ill." 9 The Court found
that "neither New York's ban on assisting suicide, nor its statutes
permitting patients to refuse medical care treat anyone differ-
ently from anyone else or draw any distinctions between per-
sons. ' 2 °  According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, "everyone,
regardless of physical condition, is entitled, if competent, to re-
fuse unwanted lifesaving medical treatment; no one is permitted
to assist a suicide.'' Since the laws apply evenhandedly to all
people, reasoned Chief Justice Rehnquist, they comply with the
requirements of equal protection.
22
Furthermore, the Court noted, discontinuation of life-
sustaining treatment is not equivalent to physician-assisted sui-
cide.' 2' The Second Circuit, said Chief Justice Rehnquist, incor-
rectly determined that refusing lifesaving treatment and assisted
suicide are the same. As a result, the Second Circuit wrongly
concluded that all terminally ill people are not treated equally
under New York law.1
25
According to the Chief Justice, there is a clear difference
between letting a patient die and making that patient die; that
distinction is based on principles of causation and intent.
126
First, when a patient ends life-sustaining medical care, he dies
from natural causes. 27 By contrast, when a patient consumes
"lethal medication prescribed by a physician, he is killed by that
,,128
medication. Second, a physician who withdraws life-
sustaining medical treatment intends "only to respect his pa-
tient's wishes and 'to cease doing useless and futile or degrading
things to the patient when [the patient] no longer stands to
' Id. (citing Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993)).
"9 Id. at 2297-98.
120 id.











benefit from them."'"l A doctor who assists a suicide, on the
other hand, intends that the patient die. 30 Third, a patient who
requests a physician to aid in his suicide clearly intends to end
his life, while a patient who refuses or withdraws from life-
sustaining treatment might not.3"
In support of this point, the Chief Justice noted that many
courts have differentiated refusing life-sustaining treatment
from suicide.s2 In addition, the majority of state legislatures
have adopted this principle by drawing a clear line between let-
ting a patient die and making that patient die: "even as the States
move to protect and promote patients' dignity at the end of life,
they remain opposed to physician-assisted suicide."133
According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court
implicitly recognized the distinction between the refusal of life-
saving medical treatment and assisted suicide in Cruzan v. Direc-
tor, Missouri Department of Health.134  In Cruzan, Chief Justice
Rehnquist explained, the Court concluded that a competent
person has a liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical
treatment.'s That interest is based not on a "general and ab-
stract right to hasten death,"13 but on "well established, tradi-
tional rights to bodily integrity and freedom from unwanted
touching.",37 Thus, concluded Chief Justice Rehnquist, Cruzan
provides no support for the notion that the refusal or removal
of lifesaving medical treatment and assisted suicide are equiva-
lent.'3
The Court next articulated New York's five valid interests in
this distinction: "(1) prohibiting intentional killing and preserv-
ing life; (2) preventing suicide; (3) maintaining physicians' role
" Id. (quoting from Assisted Suicide in the United States: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 368 (1996) (testi-
mony of Dr. Leon R. Kass)).
"0 Id. at 2299.
'5' Id.
Id. (citing People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714, 728 (Mich. 1994); In re Quin-
ian, 355 A.2d 647, 665, 670 & n.9 (N.J. 1976); Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 551 N.E.2d 77, 82
n.2 (N.Y. 1990)).
Id. at 2300-01.
Id. at 2301 (citing Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278
(1990)).
Id. (citing Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279).
'MId. (quoting Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 727-28 (2d Cir.1996)).




as their patients' healers; (4) protecting vulnerable people from
indifference, prejudice, and psychological and financial pres-
sure to end their lives; and (5) avoiding a possible slide towards
euthanasia."3 9 Concluding that these "public interests easily sat-
isfy the constitutional requirement that a legislative classifica-
tion bear a rational relation to some legitimate end," the Court
held that the New York prohibition on physician-assisted suicide
does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
4 0
B. JUSTICE SOUTER'S CONCURRENCE
In his concurrence, Justice Souter agreed that assisted sui-
cide currently is not a fundamental right.4 1 He wrote sepa-
rately, however, to emphasize that assisted suicide is an
important interest that demands careful scrutiny by the state.
Specifically, he articulated three arguments in support of the
right to assisted suicide. First, historically, society has not sanc-
tioned assisted suicide. 3 Second, the state's interest in bodily
autonomy, which has been recognized in the abortion context,
may also be applied in the context of physician-assisted sui-
cide.4 Lastly, an individual is entitled to a physician's assistance
in dying when death is imminent.4 5  Notwithstanding these
points, Justice Souter ultimately concluded that the state's in-
terest in preserving life defeats any claim in favor of physician-
assisted suicide. 6 In particular, Justice Souter gave significant
weight to the state's interest in protecting patients from making
hasty decisions to end their lives. 4 7  He was also concerned
about preventing euthanasia.
48
139 Id. at 2302.
140 Id.
141 Id& (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter's concurrence regarding the Equal
Protection Clause was discussed in Quill's companion case, Washington v. Glucksberg,
117 S. Ct. 2258, 2275 (1997).
142 Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2290 (SouterJ., concurring).
.. Id. at 2289 (SouterJ., concurring).
' Id. at 2289-90 (SouterJ., concurring).
... Id. at 2290 (SouterJ., concurring).
16 Id. (SouterJ., concurring).
"1 Id. (SouterJ., concurring).
' Id. (SouterJ., concurring). Specifically, Justice Souter feared that:
Voluntary and involuntary euthanasia may result once doctors are authorized to
prescribe lethal medication in the first instance, for they might find it pointless
to distinguish between patients who administer their own fatal drugs and those
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Finally, Justice Souter determined that the legislature is in
the best position to address the respondents' claim because a
legislature has the best opportunity to obtain the facts to resolve
this controversy.149 As such, Justice Souter said, although physi-
cian-assisted suicide is not a fundamental right at this time, it is
an important interest that should be addressed by the legisla-
ture.1
50
C. JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S CONCURRENCE
Justice O'Connor concurred with the Court's conclusion
that "there is no generalized right to commit suicide.'' Justice
O'Connor wrote separately, however, to suggest that there is no
need for the Court to address the narrower issue of whether a
terminally ill patient has a constitutional right to control his or
her death.5  Because terminally ill patients can receive medica-
tion to alleviate their pain, Justice O'Connor reasoned, the state
interests are sufficient to justify a ban against physician-assisted
suicide.5
Justice O'Connor was confident that the democratic process
would adequately balance the interests of the terminally ill, who
wish to hasten their death, with the state's interests in prevent-
ing those individuals from ending their lives mistakenly or un-
der pressure.5 ForJustice O'Connor, the "difficulty in defining
terminal illness and the risk that a dying patient's request for as-
sistance in ending his or her life might not be truly voluntary
justifies the prohibitions on assisted suicide.' 5
who wish not to, and their compassion for those who suffer may obscure the dis-
tinction between those who ask for death and those who may be unable to re-
quest it.
Id. (SouterJ., concurring).
' Id. at 2293 (Souter,J., concurring).
0 Id. (Souter,J., concurring).
" Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. CL 2293, 2303 (1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted). Justices Ginsburg and Breyer joined in Justice
O'Connor's opinion.
1 Id. (O'Connor,J., concurring).
"" Id. (O'Connor,J., concurring).
.. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor indicated that the states are
taking great effort to handle the issue: "[T]he task of crafting appropriate procedures
for safeguarding... liberty interests is entrusted to the 'laboratory' of the States...
in the first instance." Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Cruzan v. Director,
Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 292 (1990) (O'ConnorJ., concurring)).
"' Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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D. JUSTICE STEVENS' CONCURRENCE
Justice Stevens reiterated the majority view that there is no
absolute constitutional right to assisted suicide, 5 6 acknowledg--
ing, however, that there are situations in which an interest in
hastening death is legitimate. Justice Stevens cited Cruzan'58 as
an example of such a situation. 9 Although Cruzan is not di-
rectly on point, Justice Stevens explained, it does raise issues of
personal autonomy and the right to decide how to die.'w Ac-
cording to Justice Stevens, Cruzan makes it clear that an individ-
ual may have a constitutionally protected interest in choosing to
die that outweighs the state's interest in preserving life.'
6'
Justice Stevens reasoned that the state interests in prohibit-
ing physician-assisted suicide are not equally strong in all
cases. 62 The "unqualified interest in the preservation of human
life," 163 Justice Stevens argued, should not always outweigh the
will of a patient who wishes to hasten her death because of pain
and suffering. 6 Next, Justice Stevens remarked that the state's
interests in "preventing suicide, protecting the vulnerable from
coercion and abuse, and preventing euthanasia are less signifi-
cant in this context."' Justice Stevens indicated that the state's
interest in preventing abuse is irrelevant when a patient makes a
rational and voluntary decision. '6 In addition, although Justice
Stevens acknowledged the state's interest in preventing de-
pressed people from resorting to suicide, he noted that experts
can work with terminally ill patients to help them cope with de-
pression in assessing their options.67 Finally, Justice Stevens
6 Id. at 2307 (StevensJ, concurring).
1
57 Id. at 2305 (Stevens,J., concurring).
... See supra notes 23-43 and accompanying text.
"" Quill, 117 S. CL at 2305-06 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Cruzan v. Director,
Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990)).
" Id. at 2307 (Stevens,J., concurring).
161 Id. (StevensJ, concurring).
162 Id. (Stevens,J., concurring).
'63 Id. at 2307-08 (Stevens, J., concurring).
161 Id. (Stevens,J., concurring). Justice Stevens stated:
Although as a general matter the State's interest in the contributions each
person may make to society outweighs the person's interest in ending her life,
this interest does not have the same force for a terminally ill patient faced not
with the choice of whether to live, only of how to die.
Id. at 2308 (Stevens,J., concurring).
'6' Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
" Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
'
67 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
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criticized the state's argument about preserving the integrity of
the medical profession. 16' For physicians who develop a rela-
tionship with a patient, who understand that patient's needs,
and who have given that patient advice on treatment, assisting
in that patient's suicide does not harm the physician-patient re-
lationship.)69
In closing, Justice Stevens agreed with the majority that
there is a distinction between the refusal of lifesaving medical
treatment and assisted suicide. 70 However, unlike the majority,
he questioned whether this was a distinction without signifi-
cance.'7 ' He stated that there may be little distinction between
the intent of a patient who wishes to remove his life-support and
one who requests the assistance of a physician in ending her
life: "[I]n both situations, the patient is seeking to hasten a cer-
,172tain, impending death." Furthermore, in both circumstances,
the doctor "may seek simply to ease the patient's suffering and
to comply with her wishes."'73 Thus, Justice Stevens concluded,
the outcome of a particular case must necessarily depend on the
specific facts of that case. 74
E. JUSTICE BREYER'S CONCURRENCE
Justice Breyer agreed with the majority that there is a dis-
tinction to be drawn between physician-assisted suicide and
withdrawal of lifesaving medical treatment.'75 However, Justice
Breyer disagreed with the Court's characterization of the plain-
tiffs' claimed liberty interest as a "right to commit suicide with
another's assistance.' ' 76 Breyer offered what he thought to be a
more appropriate and historically supported formulation, the
"right to die with dignity."' 77 Irrespective of the words used to
describe the claimed right, Justice Breyer felt that the Court
'0 Id. at 2308-09 (StevensJ, concurring). This interest focuses on preserving the
traditional healing role of the doctor. Id. (Stevens,J., concurring).
" Id. at 2309 (StevensJ, concurring).
'
70 Id. at 2309-10 (Stevens,J., concurring).
171 Id. at 2310 (Stevens,J., concurring).
,7 Id. (Stevens,J., concurring).
" Id. (Stevens,J., concurring).
,71 Id. (Stevens,J., concurring).
" Id. at 2311 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Breyer also agreed with Justice
O'Connor's separate opinion, except insofar as itjoined the majority's opinion.
,76 Id. (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing id. at 2269).
" Id. (BreyerJ., concurring).
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need not and should not decide whether such a right is "fun-
damental."17 8 That determination is not essential because the
current laws do not force a terminally ill person to suffer from
severe pain.'7 The laws permit doctors to prescribe drugs to
ameliorate their patients' pain."' According to Justice Breyer,
since doctors can provide patients with these pain killers, "the
laws of New York and Washington would overcome any remain-
ing significant interests and would be justified."
181
V. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court in Vacco v. Quill held that two New York
statutes prohibiting physician-assisted suicide do not violate the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Part A
of this section argues that the Supreme Court improperly de-
termined that physician-assisted suicide is not a fundamental
right. The right to die with assistance is a fundamental right
that is deeply rooted in our nation's history and is implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty. Part B of this section argues that
the Court erred by distinguishing between the withdrawal of
lifesaving medical treatment and physician-assisted suicide. The
Court should have determined on the basis of intent and causa-
tion that the two acts are the same. Part C explores the asserted
state interests in banning assisted-suicide and suggests that they
do not outweigh the interest of the terminally ill person in con-
trolling his own death. Finally, this Note discusses the implica-
tions of the Court's decision, specifically the likelihood that
physician-assisted suicide will continue underground and that
hospice care will improve as a result of the ban.
A. PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE IS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
The Supreme Court was wrong when it ruled in Quill that
the right to die with assistance is not fundamental.8 In deter-
mining whether a particular right is protected by the Due Proc-
ess Clause, the Court analyzed two factors: (1) whether the
asserted right is deeply rooted in this nation's history and tradi-
,8 Id. (BreyerJ., concurring).
' Id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
,so Id. (Breyer,J., concurring).
Id. (BreyerJ., concurring).
182 The Court's reasoning is discussed in Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258
(1997). Seesupra text accompanying notes 62-79.
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tion;as3 and (2) whether the asserted right is implicit in the con-
cept of ordered liberty.84 Using either line of inquiry, the Court
should have determined that the right to die with assistance in-
volves a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.ss
First, the right of a terminally ill person to hasten an inevi-
table death has been a part of this nation's history. The tradi-
tion traces back to Greek philosophers.8 6 For instance, Plato
once commented, "If any man labour of an incurable disease,
he may dispatch himself, if it be to his good."187 Moreover, the
Stoics of Rome acknowledged suicide as a logical choice for
terminally ill individuals who had .no hope for a sustained fu-
ture.1ss
Neither the Old nor New Testament bans suicide. 89 None
of the four suicides mentioned in the Old Testament (Samson,
Saul, Abimdech and Achitophel) is denounced." In fact, the
early Christians regarded death as a way into heaven: "the more
powerfully the Church instilled in believers the idea that this
world was a vale of tears and sin and temptation, where they
waited uneasily until death released them into eternal glory, the
more irresistible the temptation to suicide became.''
Although the Church later regarded suicide as a crime, a
number of its adherents acknowledged the right of terminally ill
'' See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937).
,84 See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
'8 See supra note 30 for the text of the Due Process Clause.
"8 See Patricia A. Unz, Note, Euthanasia: A Constitutionally Protected Peaceful Death, 37
N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 439, 441-42 (1992).
... PLATO, THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO BOOKIII, 406A-409 (Alan Bloom ed., 1968). In
determining other liberty interests, the Court has given weight to the tradition of the
Greeks. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 130-32 (1973).
" Unz, supra note 186, at 441-42. Seneca, the great Roman orator, stated:
I will not relinquish old age if it leaves my better part intact. But if it begins to
shake my mind, if it destroys its faculties one by one, if it leaves me not life but
breath, I will depart from the putrid or tottering edifice .... if I must suffer
without hope of relief, I will depart, not through fear of the pain itself, but be-
cause it prevents all for which I would live.
SHERWIN B. NULAND, HowWEDIE 151 (1993) (quoting Seneca).
,' See Alfred Alvarez, The Background, in M. PABST BATITN & DAVIDJ. MAYO, SUICIDE:
THEPHmoSOPHICAL ISSUES 12 (1980).
'9 Id.




individuals to commit suicide. 2 As Sir Thomas Moore indi-
cated, a terminally ill person should be able to commit suicide
so as to "despatch [sic] himself out of that painful life, as out of
a prison.' 93
During the late 1800s, assisted suicide was a crime, but it was
never punished. 4 In fact, there is no evidence that any court
ever imposed punishment for suicide or attempted suicide un-
der common law in post-revolutionary America.9 5 By the time
the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted in 1868, suicide was
generally not punishable, and in only nine of the thirty-seven
states is it clear that there were statutes prohibiting assisting sui-
cide. 6
Today, even though most states criminalize assisted sui-
cide,' 97 there is no reported case of a physician receiving a
criminal penalty for aiding in a patient's suicide.9 8 This persis-
tent reluctance ofjuries to convict illustrates society's belief that
there is no right to force the terminally ill to continue suffering,
and no right to convict those who aid the terminally ill in end-
ing their pain and suffering. Overall, it is evident that the right
to assisted suicide is grounded in our nation's history and tradi-
tion.
The right to die with assistance is also a liberty interest pro-
tected by the Fourteenth Amendment.9' In a number of cases,
the Court has upheld the constitutionally protected right of self-
determination and personal autonomy. °° More specifically,
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health2 °1 and Planned
'92 SeeAlvarez, supra note 189, at 25-28.
See 0. RurH RUSSELL, FREEDOM TO DIE 55-56 (1975).
194 Catherine D. Shaffer, Note, Criminal Liability for Assisting Suicide, 86 COLuM. L.
REV. 348, 350 (1986).
195 Id.
'9 See Marzen et al., supra note 191, at 76.
197 Physician-Assisted Suicide, supra note 10, at 2031 n.8.
T. Howard Stone & William J. Winslade, Physician-Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia
in the United States, 16J. LEGAL MED. 481, 492 (1995).
"9 Physician-Assisted Suicide, supra note 10, at 2025-26.
'0 The Court has invoked the liberty interest to protect a woman's right to abor-
tion, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); to protect the rights of unmarried individuals
to have access to contraceptives, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); to protect
personal decisions concerning marriage, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); to pro-
tect married persons' right to have access to contraceptives, Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965); and to protect the right to procreate, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535 (1942).
00' 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
[Vol. 88
PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICDE
Parenthood v. Case 0 2 demonstrate that this liberty interest in-
cludes the right of terminally ill patients to hasten death in a
peaceful manner.
The desire of a terminally ill patient to control the end of
his or her life should be a personal decision. The Court in
Cruzan espoused this interest, stating, "The choice between life
and death is a deeply personal decision of obvious and over-
whelming finality., 20 3 Moreover, in its holding in Cruzan, the
Court noted that "[T]he principle that a competent person has
a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted
medical treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions.
The Court in Casey further expressed this right to protect an
individual's freedom to decide the course of his or her life. As
the Court eloquently stated:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a per-
son may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and
autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own con-
cept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of hu-
man life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of
personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State. "
Although Casey concerned a woman's right to abortion, the
Court's reasoning is relevant to the case considered in this
Note.2° Just as a woman who is confronted with an unwanted
pregnancy, a terminally ill patient encounters "suffering [that]
is too intimate and personal for the State to insist, without
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
' Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 281. In his dissent, Justice Brennan commented, "Dying is
personal. And it is profound. For many, the thought of an ignoble end, steeped in
decay, is abhorrent. A quiet, proud death, bodily integrity intact, is a matter of ex-
treme consequence." Id. at 310-11 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens, in his
dissent, stated, "Choices about death touch the core of liberty. Our duty, and the
concomitant freedom, to come to terms with the conditions of our own mortality are
undoubtedly 'so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
ranked as fundamental.'" Id. at 343 (Stevens,J, dissenting).
Thus, it is evident that Cruzan is not just a case about the right to terminate lifesav-
ing medical treatment, but is really a case concerning self-determination, personal
autonomy, and the right to control the time and manner of one's death.
2" Id. at 278.
2" Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
For example, the district court in Glucksberg stated, "Like the decision of
whether or not to have an abortion," the decision how and when to die is one of "the
most intimate and person choices a person may make in a lifetime," a choice "central
to personal dignity and autonomy." Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F.
Supp. 1454, 1459 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
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more, upon its own vision... however dominant that vision has
been in the course of our history and our culture."2 7
In addition to the Supreme Court, other courts have also
recognized this right. The Quinlan court acknowledged the im-
portance of personal decision-making in ruling that parents had
a right to remove their daughter from lifesaving treatment 8
This liberty interest was likewise acknowledged in Lee v. Oregon
when that court commented: "it may be a valid public policy to




In sum, courts have recognized the fight to self-
determination and personal autonomy in a number of contexts.
Like the rights at issue in these other circumstances, the right of
a terminally ill person to determine the time, place, and man-
ner of his or her death is clearly a decision of personal dignity
and autonomy. Accordingly, the Court should have determined
that the right to physician-assisted suicide is protected by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Supreme Court has likewise recognized a liberty inter-
est involving bodily integrity.21  On numerous occasions, the
Court has indicated that a person has the right to control the
course of his or her own medical treatment.211 Most recently,
the Court in Cruzan stated that "a competent person has a con-
stitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted
medical treatment."2 1 2 Justice O'Connor, in her concurrence in
Cruzan, commented that "our notions of liberty are inextricably
entwined with our idea of physical freedom and self-
determination. 213 Implicit in these statements is the idea that a
terminally ill person has a liberty interest in determining the
course of his or her medical treatment. This interest is so fun-
damental that it should be applicable even when one wishes to
hasten death. Accordingly, this component of liberty should ex-
27 Casey, 505 U.S. at 852.
In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (1976). See supra text accompanying notes 14-22
2"' 891 F. Supp. 1429, 1434 (D. Or. 1995). See supra text accompanying notes 50-58.
210 See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990); Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753
(1985); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
2" See cases cited supra note 210.
212 Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S 261, 278 (1990).
2" Id. at 287 (O'ConnorJ, concurring).
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tend to the instant case since the plaintiffs, as in Cruzan, had an
interest in quickening their death.
Overall, an analysis of the history of assisted suicide as well
as case law demonstrates that the Due Process Clause of the
Constitution protects the right of a terminally ill patient to end
his suffering by hastening death with the assistance of a physi-
cian.
B. WITHDRAWAL OF LIFESAVING MEDICAL TREATMENT AND
PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE ARE THE SAME
In Quill, the Supreme Court incorrectly concluded that phy-
sician-assisted suicide and the termination of lifesaving medical
treatment are different in nature.1 4 In making this determina-
tion, the Court relied on legal principles of causation and in-
tent.215 First, the Court attempted to distinguish assisted suicide
from the termination of lifesaving medical treatment by con-
tending that, in the latter case, the doctor takes no affirmative
action that causes the patient's death.1  But, the Supreme
Court itself has recognized that this is not so.Y In Cruzan, the
Court indicated that when a person dies from the termination
of lifesaving treatment, that death is the result of hydration and
nutrition being withdrawn and not from natural causes.218 Thus,
neither physician-assisted suicide nor the withdrawal of lifesav-
ing medical treatment results in a "natural" death; rather, in
both situations, the physician provides the medical assistance to
meet the patient's desire to end his or her suffering.
219
211 Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293, 2298 (1997).
215 Id.
216 Id. ("when a patient refuses life-sustaining medical treatment, he dies from an
underlying fatal disease or pathology; but if a patient ingests lethal medication pre-
scribed by a physician, he is killed by that medication.").
217 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280.
21 Id. The Second Circuit made a similar argument in Quill v. Vacco. "Indeed,
there is nothing 'natural' about causing death by means other than the original ill-
ness or its complications. The withdrawal of nutrition brings on death by starvation,
the withdrawal of hydration brings on death by dehydration, and the withdrawal of
ventilation brings about respiratory failure." 80 F.3d 716, 729 (2d Cir. 1996).
219 The withdrawal of lifesaving equipment requires the physician to take a number
of actions: (1) turn off the respirator, (2) disconnect the machine from the tube that
goes to the patient's lungs; (3) remove the tube from the patient's lung, (4) adminis-
ter morphine or barbiturates to ease the patient's sense of suffocation; and (5) moni-
tor medical levels to ensure that symptoms of severe air hunger do not arise. See Quill
Supplemental Decl. at 5, Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997) (No. 95-1858).
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Similarly flawed is the Court's argument that a patient re-
questing cessation of lifesaving treatment may not intend to
die. ° Many terminally ill patients suffer so much from their ill-
ness that they ask to discontinue medical treatment in the hope
of dying.22' Like those on life-sustaining medical equipment,
these patients seek to hasten death "because the quality of life
during the time remaining... ha[s] been terribly diminished,"
and their lives have "been physically destroyed and its quality,
dignity, and purpose gone."222 In addition, stating that the pa-
tient does not intend suicide since he only wants a natural death
assumes that the termination of life-sustaining treatment does
223 224not cause a patient's death. 3 That is not the case.
In sum, the Supreme Court's distinction between terminat-
ing medical treatment and assisting a patient's suicide is uncon-
vincing. In both situations, the patient is making a decision to
hasten death in order to prevent further suffering. As Justice
Scalia noted in Cruzan, a terminally ill patient who asks to ter-
minate lifesaving treatment, like one who wishes to hasten death
through the self-administration of drugs, makes a "conscious
decision to pu[t] an end to his own existence." '
C. THE STATE HAS NO LEGITIMATE INTEREST IN PROHIBITING
PHSYICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE
The Equal Protection Clause requires that a legislative
mandate be rationally related to some legitimate end. 6 In
Vacco v. Quill, the Court acknowledged five "legitimate" interests
as justification for banning physician-assisted suicide. 7 How-
ever, none of these interests justifies an absolute ban on physi-
cian-assisted suicide: none outweighs the right of a competent,
terminally ill individual to decide to end his or her suffering.
First, the Court's statements regarding the state's interest in
preserving life 22 fail to recognize that such an interest varies,
220 Quil 117 S. Ct. at 2299.
221 See Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 162-63 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
22 See Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 304-05 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
2- Physician-Assisted Suicide, supra note 10, at 2030.
" See supra notes 216-19 and accompanying text.
22' See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 296-97 (1990) (Scalia,
J., concurring) (internal quotation and citation omitted).
"'Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293, 2302 (1997).
Id. See supra note 139 and accompanying text for a description of the interests.
28 Quill, 117 S. Ct. at 2302.
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depending on the stage and quality of life. In fact, the state's
interest in preserving life weakens as the individual approaches
death.22 For instance, the Quinlan court concluded that a
state's interest in preserving life "weakens and the individual's
right to privacy grows as the degree of bodily invasion increases
and the prognosis dims., 230 Moreover, the Court in Cruzan rea-
soned that the state's interest is "greatest when an affliction [is]
curable" and less so when "the issue is not whether, but when,
for how long, and at what cost to the individual [a] life may be
briefly extended."2 3' The Court weighed the state's interest in
preserving life against the constitutionally protected interests of
the patient and concluded that the latter's interest was
stronger.2 2 Similarly, the Court in Quill should have recognized
that the individual's interest in ending his or her suffering out-
weighs any state interest in preserving life.
Likewise, preventing suicides is not a legitimate reason for
prohibiting physician-assisted suicide. A state can assume that a
person who is not terminally ill will enjoy many years of future
life. Accordingly, it is justifiable for a state to prevent suicide in
order to protect the individual from making a rash decision.
Conversely, a patient suffering from terminal illness has little
expectation of a quality future life. Hence, the state's interest in
preventing suicide is significantly reduced. In fact, by prevent-
ing a terminally ill patient from hastening death, the court
forces the person to continue suffering from intense pain and
physical deterioration. Preventing suicide is therefore an ille-
gitimate reason for prohibiting physician-assisted suicide.
The third interest, maintaining physicians' role as their pa-
tients' healers,"4 also does not justify a ban on physician-assisted
suicide. As the Second Circuit correctly stated, "the writing of a
See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 271; In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (NJ. 1976).
Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 664.
2' Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 271 (quoting Superintendent of Belchertown State School v.
Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 426 (Mass. 1977)). In Cruzan, Justice Brennan indicated
that "the State has no legitimate general interest in someone's life, completely ab-
stracted from the interest of the person living that life, that could outweigh the per-
son's choice to avoid medical treatment." Id. at 313 (Brennan,J., dissenting). Justice
Stevens also found the state's abstract interest in the preservation of life to be an in-
adequate basis for overriding patient choice. See id. at 331 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
2' Id. at 281-84.




prescription to hasten death... involves a far less active role for
the physician than is required in bringing about death through"
the withdrawal of lifesaving medical treatment. s5  In addition,
the Ninth Circuit in Compassion in Dying ruled, "[g] iven the simi-
larity between what doctors are now permitted to do and what
the plaintiffs assert they should be permitted to do, we see no
risk at all to the integrity of the profession."236 Indeed, opinion
polls also indicate that the majority of doctors advocate aiding
terminally ill patients in hastening death . Thus, allowing phy-
sician-assisted suicide would not erode the physicians' role as
their patients' healers.
Fourth, the risk that "vulnerable people" will be exposed to
"indifference, prejudice, and psychological and financial pres-
sure to end their lives t s8 is just as great when a patient seeks to
terminate lifesaving treatment as when a patient seeks self-
administering drugs to hasten death. Family members and phy-
sicians are confronted with the same incentives whether the pa-
tient seeks withdrawal from life-sustaining medical treatment or
231assistance from a doctor in ending his life by other means.
Finally, the state interest in preventing a possible slide to-
wards euthanasia 240 is irrelevant. Currently, competent termi-
nally ill patients have the right to end lifesaving medical
treatment.24' Thus, the state's interest in banning physician-
assisted suicide in order to prevent a slide towards euthanasia,
conduct which is already legal, is invalid. Moreover, this sort of
slippery-slope argument may be made in opposition to any con-
2s Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 729 (2d Cir. 1996).
Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 828 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd sub
nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997). Justice Stevens also ad-
dressed this interest and stated that for physicians who have developed a relationship
with their patients, assisting in a suicide would not harm that relationship. See Quill,
117 S. Ct. at 2309.
07 Researchers polled 938 physicians in the State of Washington and found that
54% supported physician-assisted suicide under certain circumstances. Jonathan S.
Cohen et al., Attitudes Toward Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia Among Physicians in Wash-
ington State, 331 NEW ENG.J. MED. 89 (1994). Jerald Bachman found that 54% of doc-
tors polled in Michigan supported legislation legalizing physician-assisted suicide for
terminally ill individuals. Jerald G. Bachman, Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in Michi-
gan, 331 NEw ENG.J. MED. 812 (1994).
m QuiV, 117 S. Ct. at 2302.
'9 Amicus Curiae of State Legislature in Support of Respondents Michael Doff and
Sherry Colb at 21, Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997) (No. 95-1858).
210 Quia, 117 S. Ct. at 2302.
21, See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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stitutional right. Indeed, this interest has nothing to do with
the right of competent, terminally ill patients to voluntarily has-
ten death.
D. RAMIFICATIONS OF THE COURT'S DECISION
There are at least two results likely to stem from the Su-
preme Court's holding in Quill. First, even though the Supreme
Court found that a terminally ill patient does not have a consti-
tutionally protected right to die with assistance,242 covert assisted
suicide will continue. Even before Vacco v. Quill, assisted suicide
was already criminalized throughout the United States.243 None-
theless, there was a "violation of [the] legal prohibitions and a
secret, underground practice" of physician-assisted suicide.244
Many doctors are sympathetic to the suffering of the terminally
ill. In fact, it is possible that there will be substantial defiance of
the laws banning assisted suicide, rendering the "statutes pro-
hibiting assisted suicide merely symbolic, essentially defended as
a form of state propaganda of one moralistic view, rather than a
realistic regulation of behavior.,
24
Second, although this Note has criticized the Supreme
Court's reasoning, the Court's decision may have a positive im-
pact on the health care system, including more widespread use
of hospice care and the advancement of palliative medicine. As
the American Medical Association indicated, "the prohibition
on physician-assisted suicide provides health care professionals
with an incentive to improve and expand the availability of pal-
liative care." 46 Developments in palliative medicine are signifi-
cant since they would help to alleviate patients' fears of painful
2
42 See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
21 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
244 Daniel Callahan & Margot White, The Legalization of Physician-Assisted Suicide:
Creating a Regulatory Potemkin Village, 30 U. RI-m. L. REv. 1, 4 (1996). In fact, a study
conducted in Washington illustrates the use of covert assisted suicide. SeeAnthony L.
Back et al., Physician-Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in Washington State: Patient Requests
and Physician Responses, 275 JAMA 919, 920 (1996). In the study, 1,443 doctors were
asked whether any of their patients had requested them to assist in a suicide. Id. Of
the 828 doctors responding, 218 had received such requests. Id. at 920-21. Forty-
three doctors assisted their patients. Id.
'2' Brief of the Coalition of Hospice Professionals as Amicus Curiae for Affirmance
of theJudgments Below at 17, Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997) (No. 95-1858).
246 See Brief of the American Medical Association et al. as Amici Curiae in Support
of Petitioners at 6-8, Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997) (95-1858).
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death . 7 Furthermore, criminalizing assisted suicide may force
an increase in the number and availability of hospices to serve
the needs of the terminally ill.
2 48
VI. CONCLUSION
In Vacco v. Quill, the Supreme Court incorrectly held that
two New York statutes prohibiting physician-assisted suicide did
not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The right to die with assistance is a fundamental
right, since it is part of this nation's history and is implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty. Furthermore, the Court erred in
differentiating between physician-assisted suicide and the with-
drawal of lifesaving medical treatment. Finally, the Court
should have concluded that the state has no legitimate interest
in banning physician-assisted suicide. As a result of this deci-
sion, all terminally ill patients have lost their constitutionally
guaranteed right to die with assistance.
BRETr FEINBERG
247 Patients often request assistance in committing suicide out of fear that their
pain will become intolerable. See id. at 6-10. In addition, the decision of a physician
to engage in assisted suicide usually occurs after efforts to alleviate the patient's pain
have failed. See Herbert Hendin, Seduced by Death: Doctors, Patients, and the Dutch Care,
10 ISSUES IN L. & MED. 123 (1994). By improving palliative medicine, both physicians
and patients may be less inclined to consider suicide. Id.
2'8 During oral argument, the Court noted that the Netherlands has a total of three
palliative care facilities for its terminally ill. On the other hand, England, which pro-
hibits physician-assisted suicide, has 185. See Official Transcript Proceedings Before
The Supreme Court of the United States at 51-52, Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293
(1997) (No. 95-1858).
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